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DIAZ V. BREWER AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: 
  A ROADMAP FOR THE RETENTION OF SAME-SEX PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
Benjamin K. Probber
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At the time of this writing, forty-one states have statutes or consti-
tutional provisions that prevent same-sex couples from marrying un-
der state law by defining marriage as between one man and one 
woman.1
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2009, Tulane Universi-
ty.  I would like to thank Professors Sophia Z. Lee and Tobias Barrington Wolff for their 
insightful suggestions, and the editors and Board of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law for their assistance throughout the editing process.  I also would par-
ticularly like to thank Marc Rogers and my family for their unyielding patience and sup-
port. 
  The statutes and constitutional provisions were mostly 
 1 States with constitutional provisions defining marriage as between one man and one 
woman include:  Alabama (2006), Alaska (1998), Arizona (2008), Arkansas (2004), Cali-
fornia (2008), Colorado (2008), Florida (2008), Georgia (2004), Idaho (2006), Kansas 
(2005), Kentucky (2004), Louisiana (2004), Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Mis-
souri (2004), Montana (2004), Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2002), North Dakota (2004), 
Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (2004), Oregon (2004), South Carolina (2006), South Dakota 
(2006), Tennessee (2006), Texas (2005), Utah (2004), Virginia (2006), and Wisconsin 
(2006).  See ALA. CONST. amend. 774; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, 
§ 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA. 
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 
XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. 
CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. 
XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; 
S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art I, § 32; UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; see also HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2010), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (follow “Statewide Mar-
riage Prohibition Laws”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (providing a visual reference for states 
and their current legislative statutes regarding same-sex marriage as well as the enactment 
dates of state constitutional provisions).  Several of these states ban all forms of same-sex 
unions, not only same-sex marriages.  See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art I, § 32 (“Marriage in this 
state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.  This state or a political 
subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to 
marriage.”).  In addition to those states listed above, states with a statute restricting mar-
riage to one man and one woman include:  Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming.  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2010), avail-
able at http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (follow “Statewide 
Marriage Prohibition Laws”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).  Note that the legislatures of 
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passed subsequent to the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”),2 in which Congress barred federal recognition of same-
sex marriage and allowed the states to do so as well, by permitting 
states not to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other 
states.3  DOMA was passed partly in response to attempts at legalizing 
same-sex marriage.4  Its proponents expressed concern over the po-
tential extension of state and federal marriage-related benefits to 
same-sex couples.5  These benefits run the gamut, but often include 
employment benefits, such as bereavement leave and sick leave, un-
employment compensation, and healthcare insurance for public sec-
tor employees, their partners, and dependents.6
 
Washington and Maryland have since passed laws allowing same-sex marriage, but the 
laws have not yet taken effect.  NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEFINING 
MARRIAGE:  DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACTS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Issues-Research/Human-Services/Same-Sex-Marriage-overview.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012).  California’s gay marriage ban has been found invalid by a fed-
eral court of appeals, but the court’s enforcement is pending further appeals.  Id.  See also 
Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *11 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) 
(holding that “Proposition 8 serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen 
the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify 
their relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex couples”).  The infor-
mation in this footnote is verified as of April 18, 2012. 
 
 2 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person 
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“No 
State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding 
of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising 
from such relationship.”).  Three states—Wyoming (1957), Maryland (1973), and New 
Hampshire (1987)—have statutes defining marriage that pre-dated DOMA, although the 
Maryland legislature has recently passed a same-sex marriage law; see NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIPS, available at http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices 
/SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).  See also Andrew 
Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265, 265–66 (2007) 
(referring to most state statutes banning same-sex marriage as “mini-DOMAs” because 
they mimic the effects of the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996). 
 3 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); Mark Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 399, 402, 412 (2010) (discussing the two provisions of 
DOMA). 
 4 See Strasser, supra note 3, at 401 n.9 (quoting In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 132 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 17, 2004) (“Congress recognized that the Hawaii Supreme Court appeared to 
be on the verge of requiring the State of Hawaii to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.”)). 
 5 See 142 CONG. REC. 22448 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“On a more pragmatic level 
although no less important, this bill also addresses concerns with respect to the matter of 
Federal benefits.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits:  Redefining Family in the Work 
Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 49, 50 (1994) (“Benefits employers confer upon domestic 
partners include various combinations of bereavement leave, family sick leave, health in-
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In states that contain statutory and constitutional restrictions on 
same-sex marriage, public-sector employees in same-sex relationships7 
are usually ineligible for the employment benefits that are traditional-
ly bestowed upon their married, heterosexual counterparts.  Never-
theless, several states, cities, and local municipalities have successfully 
extended public employment benefits8 to same-sex couples, despite 
continued political resistance.9  These benefits are typically granted 
to same-sex and opposite-sex couples who register their domestic 
partnership with the state, city, or local government, according to 
some established criteria.10  Yet legislative acts, public referenda, and 
judicial decisions in several communities have recently resulted in 
same-sex public employment benefits being withdrawn.11
 
surance coverage, subsidized travel and relocation expenses, and employee discounts.”); 
Sue Nussbaum Averill, Comment, Desperately Seeking Status:  Same-Sex Couples Battle For Em-
ployment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REV. 253, 253 n.5 (1993) (“These benefits include 
but may not be limited to health and dental insurance, life insurance, various types of 
leave, Social Security, workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, and 
pension or retirement plans.”). 
  In these 
 7 Generally, the terms “same-sex relationship(s)” or “same-sex couple(s)” and “domestic 
partner(s)” or “domestic partnership(s)” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Comment, and unless domestic partner(s) or partnership(s) are qualified by “opposite-
sex,” they will refer to same-sex domestic partner(s) or partnership(s). 
 8 This Comment uses “public employee benefit(s)” or “public employment benefit(s)” and 
“state employee benefit(s)” or “state employment benefit(s)” interchangeably, but state 
employee or employment benefits also refer to benefits provided by local governments 
and municipalities within each state unless noted otherwise. 
 9 States with domestic partnership laws that incorporate same-sex couples include:  Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and the District of Columbia;.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 15-22-101 (LexisNexis 2010); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2009); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2011); MD. CODE REGS. 17.04.13.01 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-
1, 26:8A-4 (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122A.010, 122A.100 (Lexis-Nexis 2009); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.300 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.010, 
26.60.030 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001, 770.05 (2011).  For an example of a do-
mestic partnership at the county level, see Domestic Partner Registry, 
WESTCHESTERGOV.COM, http://lgbt.westchestergov.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=2561&Itemid=4427 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).  For examples of domes-
tic partnership laws in cities, see New York City, N.Y., CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE § 3-240 
(West 2010), and S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 62.1, 62.3 (2006). 
 10 See supra note 9. (providing several state and municipal statutes as evidence of criteria for 
and registration of domestic partnerships). 
 11 See, e.g., Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800–01 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011) (evaluating House Bill 2013, 
passed by the Arizona legislature, and signed into law by Governor Janet Brewer).  Al-
though the district court case title for the order granting a preliminary injunction was Col-
lins, et al. v. Brewer, et al., on June 6, 2011, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiff-appellee’s  
unopposed motion to dismiss Tracy  Collins.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision is therefore 
titled Diaz, et al. v. Brewer, et al..  For clarity, this Comment will refer to the entire case as 
Diaz v. Brewer, the district court proceedings as Diaz I, and the appeals court proceedings 
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communities, same-sex couples may no longer be eligible to register 
for public benefits,12 or same-sex couples who were previously regis-
tered may even have their public benefits discontinued.13
By drawing on the parallel analytical frameworks that exist within 
state and federal equal protection jurisprudence, this Comment pro-
poses that arguments premised on state equal protection clauses, 
which have already found limited success in the expansion of same-
sex public employee benefits, should serve as guidance for litigants 
and courts coping with federal Equal Protection Clause claims that 
seek to prevent the rescission of such benefits.  It is important to note 
that the act of rescission itself does not directly affect a court’s equal 
protection analysis.
 
14
Prior legal actions brought by same-sex couples to secure state 
employment benefits have already demonstrated that arguments 
premised on state equal protection clauses can be successful in fight-
ing to extend the benefits to same-sex couples.  In Tanner v. Oregon 
Health Sciences University, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the 
university’s denial of health insurance benefits to the unmarried do-
mestic partners of its gay and lesbian employees was a violation of 
  However, the withdrawal of public benefits 
from employees in same-sex relationships, coupled with state statutes 
or constitutional provisions banning same-sex marriage, helps to re-
solve one of the traditional dilemmas faced by courts.  Such a selec-
tive withdrawal helps to clarify the distinction as one between same-
sex and opposite-sex couples, as opposed to one between married 
and unmarried ones—thereby enabling courts to find that the classi-
fication was made on the basis of sexual orientation. 
 
as Diaz II.  See also Ana Campoy, Same-Sex Benefits Ban Roils El Paso, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 
2010, at A4 (reporting that the El Paso public referendum stripped employee benefits 
from everyone other than the employee, his or her legal spouse, and dependent child-
ren); Barry Noreen, She Risks Her Life for Us, but We Deny Care for Her Partner, COLO. 
SPRINGS GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.gazette.com/articles/draper-
26785-benefits-city.html (reporting on the Colorado Springs City Council’s rescission of 
healthcare benefits for same-sex partners of city employees); Jennifer Medina, A Town in 
Westchester Ends Health Benefits for Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at B1 (report-
ing that the Eastchester Town Board agreed to no longer offer domestic partner benefits 
for its employees). 
 12 See Medina, supra note 11 (“[T]he Town Board voted . . . to end a town policy of provid-
ing coverage for domestic partners.”). 
 13 See Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (“[The legislative act] eliminates family cover-
age for non-spouse domestic partners, whether they are of the same or different sex.”).   
 14 See Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *38 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2012) (finding that Proposition 8’s withdrawal from same-sex couples of the existing de-
signation of marriage was not significant in the court’s constitutional analysis). 
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Oregon’s equal privileges and immunities clause.15  Even though the 
court did not find that the state’s anti-discrimination policy was vi-
olated, it nevertheless viewed the benefits policy as facially discrimina-
tory since the benefits were “made available on terms that, for gay 
and lesbian couples, are a legal impossibility.”16
As seen in Tanner, the extension of same-sex state employee bene-
fits occurs even in states with explicit prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riage.
 
17  The case of Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska 
held that the limitation of state employee benefits solely to opposite-
sex spouses violated Alaska’s equal protection clause.18  The plaintiffs 
in Carter were same-sex couples challenging the benefits programs, 
not Alaska’s marriage amendment, as discriminatory by denying them 
benefits that the state affords to similarly situated heterosexual 
couples.19
 
 15 Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that 
“OHSU’s denial of insurance benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of its homo-
sexual employees violated Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution”).  Oregon’s 
equal privileges and immunities clause is generally considered to have the same scope as 
the federal Equal Protection Clause.  See OR. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall be passed 
granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which upon the same 
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”); Cooper v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 629 
P.2d 386, 391 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing how the scope of Article I, section 20 and 
that of the federal Equal Protection Clause are generally the same, although Article I, sec-
tion 20 can be interpreted more broadly if there is a legal basis for doing so). 
  Carter rejected the reasoning advanced in several other 
states that compared lesbians and gay men to unmarried heterosex-
 16 Tanner, 971 P.2d at 448. 
 17 See Eric J. Lobsinger, Comment, A National Model for Reconciling Equal Protection For Same-
Sex Couples With State Marriage Amendments:  Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. 
Alaska, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 117, 119–20 (2006) (discussing the Alaska Supreme Court deci-
sion in Carter and suggesting that it provides a work-around for states with marriage 
amendments to retain their amendments while simultaneously securing important rights 
for same-sex couples).  Note that Oregon’s constitutional amendment defining marriage 
between one man and one woman was passed in 2004, subsequent to the decision in 
Tanner, but at the time of Tanner there were Oregon statutes that defined marriage as be-
tween one man and one woman.  Compare HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE 
MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2010), available at http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-
of-state-laws-policies (follow “Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws”) (last visited Dec. 4, 
2011), with Tanner, 971 P.2d at 448 (concluding that “OHSU’s denial of insurance bene-
fits to the unmarried domestic partners of its homosexual employees violated Article I, 
section 20, of the Oregon Constitution”), and OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.010, 106.041 (2007) 
(defining marriage as between a man and woman and providing for marriage license ap-
plication procedures). 
 18 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2005) 
(holding that programs offering valuable benefits to state employees’ spouses that are not 
offered to unmarried state employees’ domestic partners violate equal protection under 
the Alaska Constitution). 
 19 Id. at 787 (“They argue not that they have a right to marry each other, but that the bene-
fits programs discriminate against them by denying them benefits that the programs pro-
vide to others who, plaintiffs claim, are similarly situated.”). 
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ual couples,20 where courts found that the benefits plans were not 
discriminatory since they applied equally to both groups.21
Moreover, the same arguments are now being brought into feder-
al court, under the federal Equal Protection Clause.  A case recently 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, Diaz v. Brewer,
  Even 
though Tanner, Carter, and other early cases dealt with attempts to ex-
tend employment benefits to same-sex couples, similar arguments 
have been and should be made for the retention of benefits previous-
ly granted by state or local governments. 
22 was filed by Lambda 
Legal on behalf of several same-sex couples who would potentially be 
deprived of Arizona state employee domestic partner benefits follow-
ing the signing of Arizona House Bill 2013 into law by Governor Ja-
nice K. Brewer on September 4, 2009.23  The bill, which contained an 
amendment entitled “Section O,” would eliminate insurance cover-
age for state employees’ domestic partners and/or their children, re-
gardless of whether the domestic partnership is same-sex or opposite-
sex.24  This case appears to present an issue of first impression in fed-
eral court, by challenging a state’s rescission of same-sex employee 
benefits on the grounds that it violates the federal Equal Protection 
Clause.25
In an important step, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a prelim-
inary injunction to protect the benefits of the same-sex couples.
 
26
 
 20 See Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL 1217283, at 
*5 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006) (citing Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689 
A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 883 
P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1994); Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Ct. App. 
1992); Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Hinman v. 
Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)) (reviewing cases in which 
“courts held that lesbians and gay men in committed relationships were similarly situated 
to unmarried heterosexuals”). 
  
The appeals court agreed with the district court and found that Sec-
tion O “distinguish[es] between homosexual and heterosexual em-
ployees, similarly situated,” thus denying homosexual employees the 
 21 See Bedford, 2006 WL 1217283, at *6 (noting that Carter rejected the reasoning that homo-
sexual couples were similarly situated to unmarried heterosexual couples). 
 22 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 23 See Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799–801 (D. Ariz. 2010) (explaining 
the posture of the complaint filed and the implications of House Bill 2013).  The statute 
challenged has been codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-651 (1971). 
 24 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801. 
 25 Id.; Complaint at 34, Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:09-cv-
02402-JWS). 
 26 Diaz v. Brewer (Diaz II), 656 F.3d at 1010. 
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same benefits for doing equivalent work as heterosexual employees.27  
Similar legal issues have subsequently been raised in Martin v. El Paso, 
a case filed in response to a voter referendum passed in El Paso, Tex-
as that stripped domestic partner benefits from the city’s public em-
ployees.28
In Part II, this Comment seeks to understand why litigants have 
chosen to file early cases over same-sex state employee benefits in 
state courts asserting (for the most part)
  As the arc of history bends towards greater equality for gay 
and lesbian individuals, Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso illustrate 
the continued importance of the federal Equal Protection Clause as 
same-sex couples fight to retain equal employment benefits in the 
public sector. 
29
 
 state equal protection-
based claims, as opposed to federal Equal Protection Clause claims in 
federal court.  This section also explores federal equal protection 
analysis and argues that litigants in federal courts can learn from the 
experiences of litigants in state courts.  In Part III, this Comment 
briefly discusses the complications that accompany claims based on 
state anti-discrimination statutes, and suggests that an emphasis on 
state and federal equal protection claims would be more beneficial to 
litigants.  In Part IV, this Comment reviews the three primary inter-
pretative difficulties that state courts have faced when resolving legal 
arguments that seek to extend state employment benefits to same-sex 
couples based upon state equal protection clauses.  In Part V, this 
Comment looks at how these difficulties of judicial interpretation 
have affected current controversies over the repeal of these benefits 
in federal court.  Finally, Part VI suggests that future cases on this 
subject will allow for more expansive federal equal protection inter-
pretation, in the same vein as recent state equal protection jurispru-
dence. 
 
 27 Id. at 1014. 
 28 See Complaint at 4, Martin v. El Paso, No. 2010-4936 (El Paso Cnty. Ct., 34th Jud. Dist. 
Dec. 15, 2010) (explaining how the ordinance removed health benefits from same-sex 
partners).  The case has since been transferred to federal court.  See infra note 204.  Even 
more recently, the issues have emerged in Bassett v. Synder, a case filed by the American 
Civil Liberties Union in Michigan asking the court to strike down a state law barring pub-
lic employers from providing domestic partner benefits to their employees.  See Com-
plaint at 2 & 30, Bassett v. Synder, No. 2:12-cv-10038 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/bassett-et-al-v-snyder-complaint (last visited Feb. 19, 
2012). 
 29 Prior to Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso, Ross appears to be the exception, where the 
plaintiff filed claims in state court under both state and federal equal protection and due 
process clauses.  Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 521 (Colo. 
App. 1994). 
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II.  THE CHOICE:  STATE OR FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS (OR 
BOTH)? 
Although many states, cities, and local governments have adopted 
domestic partnerships laws and have expanded state employee bene-
fits to cover same-sex couples and their dependents,30 the majority of 
jurisdictions across the country fail to provide these benefits.  As a re-
sult, one available recourse for same-sex couples who seek benefits in 
these jurisdictions is through judicial action.  Claims to extend or 
prevent the rescission of same-sex public employee benefits can be 
brought under a state’s equal protection clause or under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution31
Almost all of the earlier state cases seeking to extend public em-
ployee benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of the employees 
on the basis of equal protection relied upon state equal protection 
clauses, as opposed to the federal Equal Protection Clause.
 (or both). 
32  Part of 
the explanation behind litigants’ decision to proceed with claims 
based on state equal protection clauses may be that forty-five of the 
fifty U.S. states have given their own equal protection clauses “more 
expansive interpretations than that accorded to [the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of] the United States Constitution.”33
 
 30 See supra note 9 (providing numerous examples of states that have passed statutes expand-
ing benefits to same-sex couples). 
  This is a result of 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 32 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 784 (Alaska 2005) 
(alleging violations under the Alaska Constitution); Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 
Cal. Rptr. 410, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (considering violations under the California Con-
stitution); Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 447 (Mont. 2004) (considering vi-
olations under the Montana Constitution); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 
437 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (alleging violations under the Oregon Constitution).  In addi-
tion, several cases raised claims to extend same-sex public employee benefits on the basis 
of other grounds, which are mostly outside the limited scope of this Comment.  See, e.g., 
Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (making a claim based on state executive order and state 
equal protection clause claim); Ross, 883 P.2d at 521 (making a claim from state agency’s 
anti-discrimination rule, but coupled with state and federal equal protection and due 
process constitutional claims); Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60, 62 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (addressing a statutory claim without constitutional claims); Snet-
singer, 104 P.3d at 448 (making other state constitutional claims in addition to equal pro-
tection); Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL 
1217283, at *4 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006) (making a statutory claim without constitution-
al claims).  But see a brief discussion of statutory claims based upon anti-discrimination 
statutes infra Part III. 
 33 See 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION:  EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND 
LITIGATION § 1.7 (2011) (including the states of:  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
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the states’ ability “[to] define their internal law more expansively 
than the federal Constitution is construed.”34  Therefore, state court 
judges have been willing to interpret state constitutional guarantees 
of equal protection more broadly than the federal Equal Protection 
Clause to include the rights of same-sex public employees.35  This is 
the case even when the language of the state equal protection guar-
antee is similar or identical to the federal Equal Protection Clause.36
This also suggests that the litigants may choose to proceed in state 
court because they are forum shopping.  One commentator has 
noted that “the make-up of the bench is the most important factor 
when the legitimacy of domestic partner benefits is raised,” given the 
similarity of the analysis that state courts engage in under their re-
spective state equal protection clauses.
 
37
Despite the decision of litigants to proceed in state court and ad-
judicate claims brought under state equal protection clauses, this 
Comment argues that these cases hold significant relevance for liti-
gants in federal court who raise similar claims under the federal 
Equal Protection Clause.  The relevance is grounded in the parallel 
legal analyses that courts often employ under both state and federal 
equal protection clauses.  While it would be too difficult for this 
Comment to undertake a comprehensive review of state equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, the examples of state equal protection jurispru-
dence discussed in Part III below largely employ concepts of federal 
equal protection jurisprudence. 
 
When Congress or a state legislature enacts a statute, the statute 
usually contains a classification that categorizes people into groups 
on the basis of some characteristic.38
 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Isl-
and, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming). 
  Federal equal protection guar-
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 500 (1977) (“Other examples abound where state courts have inde-
pendently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opi-
nions of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state 
and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased.”). 
 37 Heidi Eischen, For Better or Worse:  An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits 
Legislation, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 546 (2000). 
 38 See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 34 (2010) (“All laws must 
classify and thereby create classes of people who are treated differently.”); Joseph Tuss-
man & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 345 
(1949) (“To define a class is simply to designate a quality or characteristic or trait or rela-
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antees “that those classifications will not be based upon impermissible 
criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals.”39  There-
fore, “[a] reasonable classification is one which includes all persons 
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”40
Some laws will contain a classification that requires the court to 
determine whether, under the principles of federal equal protection, 
the law is facially valid.
 
41  Thus, challenges to laws with facial classifica-
tions have two steps:  (1) the plaintiffs must show that the law results 
in members of one group being treated differently from others on 
the basis of their membership;42 and (2) if differential treatment of 
an identifiable group is shown, then the court must determine 
whether the treatment is justified under the appropriate level of scru-
tiny.43  Other statutes do not classify on their face, but instead may be 
applied in a way that creates a classification.44  In such cases, plaintiffs 
must allege and prove “an unlawful intent to discriminate against the 
plaintiff for an invalid reason.”45  This may require the court to en-
gage in further judicial inquiry into the nature of the classification, its 
purpose, and its effect.46
After identifying the classification, courts then look at the end or 
purpose of the statute and determine whether the classification is suf-
ficiently related to that end and meets the equal protection guaran-
tee.
 
47  The ultimate conclusion of whether the classification satisfies 
federal equal protection usually hinges upon the degree of judicial 
scrutiny that the court chooses to exercise over the legislature’s sta-
tute.48
 
tion, or any combination of these, the possession of which, by an individual, determines 
his membership in or inclusion within the class.”). 
  At least three levels of judicial scrutiny are applied by courts in 
 39 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.2(a) 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 40 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 38, at 346. 
 41 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39 at § 18.3(a)(i). 
 42 Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (C.D. Ill. 
1997) (citing Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 423–24 (1981)). 
 43 Hamyln, 986 F. Supp. at 1134 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217–18 (1982)). 
 44 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(i). 
 45 See Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at 1133 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)).  The 
Hamlyn court noted that “[t]he goal of requiring intent is to protect the government 
from liability for mere negligence in the application of otherwise valid laws.  Thus, in or-
der to give rise to a constitutional grievance, a departure from the norm must be rooted 
in design and not derive merely from error or fallible judgment.”  Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at 
1133 (citing Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 46 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(v). 
 47 Id. at § 18.3(a)(i). 
 48 Id. 
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equal protection cases, which in turn relate to the type of classifica-
tion that the legislature employs in its statute. 
Classifications in equal protection cases are usually categorized in-
to three groups:  (1) race, ethnicity, and alienage; (2) gender and il-
legitimacy; and (3) all other classifications.49  Laws that classify on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, or alienage50 are subject to the court’s most 
stringent equal protection test—known as “strict scrutiny”—whereby 
the classification must be narrowly tailored to only “compelling” gov-
ernment interests.51  The application of this test likely means that the 
law will be overturned.52  Laws with gender classifications must fur-
ther an “important” government interest, and the classification must 
be “substantially related” to achieving the law’s end.53  Lastly, for laws 
that contain all other classifications, the court applies “rational basis 
review,” which requires a finding that a classification is “rationally re-
lated” to achieving a “legitimate” purpose.54
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, some states have interpreted 
their own constitutions by extending equal protection to cover 
groups based on other characteristics.
 
55  It is important to note that 
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation receive strict scrutiny 
in California56 and quasi-suspect scrutiny in Connecticut.57  But this 
Comment looks at several examples of state equal protection juri-
sprudence where sexual orientation is apparently being treated un-
der rational basis review—even though, in reality, the review is more 
searching.58
 
 49 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 (2011); Paul E. 
McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection:  Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 
209, 221 (1998). 
  Finally, after identifying the classification, the law’s pur-
pose, and after determining which level of scrutiny will apply, the 
court is usually able to evaluate the law and determine whether it 
upholds the guarantee of equal protection. 
 50 The use of these traits in legislative classifications has been referred to as “suspect” by the 
courts.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(iii). 
 51 McGreal, supra note 49, at 221. 
 52 Id. at 225. 
 53 Id. at 232.  The Supreme Court has also held that intermediate scrutiny applies to classifi-
cations based on illegitimacy.  ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(iv). 
 54 McGreal, supra note 49, at 238. 
 55 See Yoshino, supra note 49, at 757 n.73. 
 56 Id. (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441–43, 452 (Cal. 2008)). 
 57 Yoshino, supra note 49, at 757 n.73 (citing Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407, 412 (Conn. 2008)). 
 58 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When 
a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a 
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”). 
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After a brief discussion of state statutory claims in Part III, this 
Comment will look to state equal protection clause jurisprudence in 
Alaska, California, Oregon, Montana, and New Hampshire, relating 
to the expansion of same-sex public employee benefits59
III.  THE PRESENCE OF STATUTORY CLAIMS BASED ON ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 
 in Part IV.  
Part V below will look at Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso to see 
how federal courts are dealing with similar doctrinal challenges, and 
in Part VI, this Comment addresses the future of federal equal pro-
tection jurisprudence.  As will be demonstrated below, state and fed-
eral courts engage in parallel equal protection analyses, such that 
prior decisions on state equal protection grounds provide strong 
guidance for litigants in federal court who seek to prevent the repeal 
of same-sex public employee benefits under the federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 
One significant difference between the state cases discussed below 
that has led to varied legal analysis and court outcomes is the pres-
ence of anti-discrimination statutes and their respective claims 
brought by litigants.  State anti-discrimination statutes currently pro-
tect gays and lesbians in several contexts, including the workplace.60
 
 59 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005); Hin-
man v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Tanner v. Or. 
Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 
P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004); Bedford v. N.H. Comm. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 
2006 WL 1217283, at *1 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006).  See also McGreal, supra note 49. 
  
Aside from providing causes of action outside the scope of equal pro-
tection, state and federal anti-discrimination statutes usually require 
parties and the court to apply either a disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact framework to its analysis, and to identify the classification 
 60 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West 2011) (prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in public and private employment, 
housing, and public accommodations); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101 (West 2010) 
(prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in public and private employ-
ment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public ac-
commodations); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 2002) (prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in public and private employment).  Although federal anti-
discrimination statutes like Title VII have not been interpreted to protect against discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation, some of these claims nevertheless fall under 
Title VII jurisprudence in the form of “sex-stereotyping” or discrimination on the basis of 
sex.  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding that “sex 
discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII”). 
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at issue.61  Claims of discrimination based on disparate treatment exist 
where an employer “treats some people less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected characte-
ristic].”62  On the other hand, disparate impact claims involve a facial-
ly neutral employment practice that burdens one group more than 
another, without the requirement of an employer’s subjective, dis-
criminatory intent that is required for disparate treatment claims.63  
State statutory claims have not had much success in the expansion of 
same-sex employee benefits.  This is in part because they involve 
complex interactions between the two analytical frameworks,64
 
 61 Due to the classification requirement and some state courts’ (like Alaska and Oregon) 
usage of disparate treatment and disparate impact frameworks in equal protection juri-
sprudence, there can be significant overlap of the legal analysis of equal protection and 
anti-discrimination claims.  See infra Part IV. 
 and 
 62 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (describing that proof of discriminatory motive is critical)).  
Even though proof of intentional discrimination is a required element for disparate 
treatment analysis under federal anti-discrimination laws like Title VII, not all states re-
quire discriminatory intent for disparate treatment analysis of state constitutional viola-
tions, nor do federal courts for federal constitutional violations.  See Hamlyn v. Rock Isl-
and Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (“[I]ntent 
does not need to be alleged or proved in a case where a government program, policy or 
statute is challenged on its face.”); Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447 (“As in Zockert, OHSU’s inten-
tions in this case are not relevant.  What is relevant is the extent to which privileges or 
immunities are not made available to all citizens on equal terms.”). 
 63 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 52–53. 
 64 Even in the state cases this Comment studies, there is confusion amongst courts and 
commentators over whether the decisions view the classification at issue as facial or neu-
tral, and thus whether they apply a disparate impact or a disparate treatment framework 
to the state equal protection clause claims.  When discussing the constitutional claim, the 
Tanner court states that “Article I, section 20, does protect against disparate treatment of 
true classes, those that have identity apart from the challenged law itself.”  Tanner, 971 
P.2d at 445.  The court goes on to find that the class, same-sex couples, “clearly is defined 
in terms of ad hominem, personal and social characteristics . . . [and these individuals] are 
members of a suspect class.”  Id. at 447.  As such, the unintended effect of their action was 
“to treat a true class of citizens disparately in violation of Article I, section 20.”  Id.  These 
statements strongly suggest that the court was applying a disparate treatment analysis, as 
opposed to the disparate impact analysis suggested by some commentators.  See, e.g., Eis-
chen, supra note 37, at 535–36 (suggesting that the court viewed the policy as facially neu-
tral under statutory and constitutional claims, which would entail disparate impact analy-
sis); Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law:  Employment Cases in the United 
States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 155 (2010) (stating that the “Tanner 
court clarified that it was using a disparate impact rather than a disparate treatment 
framework,” but citing to the court’s disposition of the statutory claim as opposed to Ore-
gon’s constitutional provision).  Interestingly, the Carter decision cites to Tanner for its 
finding that the “denial of employment benefits to unmarried domestic partners of em-
ployees had ‘disparate impact’ on homosexuals,” Carter, 122 P.3d at 788 n.31, but the 
court’s ultimate approach seems to reflect the ambiguity inherent in Tanner.  It appears 
that the Carter court read the Tanner decision as having a disparate impact analysis, yet 
the Carter court went on to find that the programs facially discriminate against homosex-
  
1364 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
claims of disparate impact, in particular, are very difficult to prove.65  
Additionally, they may also require a finding that gays and lesbians 
are a protected or suspect class.66
An example of a case based upon a state anti-discrimination sta-
tute illustrates the difficulties associated with such claims.  In Monson 
v. Rochester Athletic Club, a case involving Minnesota’s public accom-
modations anti-discrimination statute, the court found that the 
health club’s policy of allowing only married couples to participate in 
a family-membership rate was not facially discriminatory with respect 
to same-sex couples.
 
67  The court held that it was facially neutral, such 
that “it denies family memberships to unmarried heterosexual 
couples and unmarried homosexual couples alike.”68  Since a dispa-
rate impact theory was unavailable to the plaintiffs under the public 
accommodations statute, their claim was ultimately unsuccessful.69  
How the court defines the classification and the eventual outcome of 
cases with anti-discrimination claims will vary according to statutory 
language, judicial precedent,70
 
uals under a disparate treatment analysis in a manner similar to Tanner.  Compare id. at 
788 (concluding that the programs are facially discriminatory), with Tanner, 971 P.2d at 
447 (holding that even though the defendant had no intention to treat the plaintiffs dis-
parately, it did just that). 
 the make-up of the bench, as well as 
the analytical framework applied by the court.  Due to the challenges 
that accompany these claims, this Comment emphasizes the impor-
tance of state and federal equal protection claims as a means for the 
retention of same-sex public employee benefits. 
 65 See Linos, supra note 64, at 132 (“Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases fare worse 
than plaintiffs generally, and plaintiffs making disparate impact claims are particularly 
likely to lose.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 66 See Tanner, 971 P.2d at 444 (finding that the plaintiffs are members of a protected class 
but nevertheless holding that the state did not engage in an unlawful employment prac-
tice). 
 67 See Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]t is 
only when the policy combines with the marriage statute that a disparate impact oc-
curs.”). 
 68 Id. (identifying the classification as between married and unmarried couples). 
 69 Id. at 67 (finding a disparate impact framework unavailable due to the statutory language 
which “focuses solely on the public-accommodation provider’s conduct in denying the 
full and fair enjoyment of the accommodation and does not address the effects of the 
provider’s conduct caused by other factors”). 
 70 See Linos, supra note 64, at 152–55 (arguing that U.S. courts are unlikely to read anti-
discrimination statutes broadly in the context of same-sex employee benefit claims due to 
existing precedent). 
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IV.  THE THREE INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES OF STATE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAIMS IN THE EXPANSION OF SAME-SEX PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
While several cases challenging the denial of same-sex public em-
ployee benefits were ultimately unsuccessful,71 other cases have been 
successful based upon their ability to navigate the three main inter-
pretative difficulties of state72
A.  The Classification Dilemma 
 equal protection clause claims:  (1) the 
court’s identification of a statute’s classification; (2) the level of scru-
tiny that the court applies; and, at least in certain claims, (3) whether 
a discriminatory intent is present. 
Beginning in 1985, gay and lesbian litigants confronted state 
courts with claims that sought to establish their right to employee 
benefits for their same-sex spouse or dependents.  In Hinman v. De-
partment of Personnel Administration, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
District of California held that the denial of the dental care benefits 
to the partners of state employees did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the California Constitution.73
 
 71 See, e.g., Monson, 759 N.W.2d at 67 (affirming a judgment that a Minnesota health club’s 
policy of allowing only married couples to participate in a family membership rate was fa-
cially neutral with respect to same-sex couples and did not violate the state’s public ac-
commodations anti-discrimination statute); Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 
883 P.2d 516, 520 (Colo. App. 1994) (holding that the denial of family sick leave benefits 
for the plaintiff to care for her same-sex partner “treat homosexual employees and simi-
larly situated heterosexual employees differently”). 
  The dental care plans in 
question allowed employees to enroll their spouse or unmarried 
 72 Although this section focuses on the state equal protection claims brought in cases to ex-
pand same-sex public employee benefits, similar interpretive challenges apply to federal 
Equal Protection Clause claims and will be discussed in Part V in the context of Diaz v. 
Brewer and Martin v. El Paso. 
 73 Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).  Note that 
Hinman has since been superseded by statute and has been called into doubt by In re Mar-
riage Cases, among others.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (determin-
ing that the Court of Appeals in California erred in refusing to apply strict scrutiny to 
classifications based on sexual orientation); Knight v. Schwarzenegger, 2004 WL 2011407 
(Cal. Super. Sep. 8, 2004) (acknowledging that the validity of Hinman had been called in-
to question by subsequent statutes and judicial decisions).  However, the discussion of 
Hinman in this Comment, like other early cases, is due to its historical importance as an 
example of early judicial thought with regard to equal protection analysis. 
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child,74 but at that time California’s Civil Code statutorily defined a 
marriage as between one man and one woman.75
The court’s equal protection clause analysis began by determining 
what classification was made by the dental care plans, because “per-
sons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of a law 
deserve like treatment.”
 
76  The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ as-
sertion that homosexual state employees with same-sex partners are 
similarly situated to heterosexual state employees married to their 
opposite-sex spouses, instead finding that the dental plans made “a 
distinction solely on the basis of married and unmarried employees 
or annuitants, not between heterosexual or homosexual ones.”77  
Subsequent early cases followed a similar analysis to Hinman, based 
primarily on the notion that employee benefit plans limiting em-
ployees’ beneficiaries to married spouses created a distinction be-
tween married and unmarried couples, as opposed to one between 
heterosexual and homosexual couples.78
In Tanner, the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether the 
state’s failure to provide employment benefits to same-sex couples vi-
olated Oregon’s equal privileges and immunities clause or its em-
ployment anti-discrimination statute for lesbian and gay employees.
 
79
 
 74 Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 414. 
  
After finding that the statute had not been violated, the Tanner court 
went on to find that the benefits created a classification between he-
terosexual and homosexual couples, since the latter were unable to 
marry, and held that the benefits policy violated Oregon’s equal privi-
 75 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1985) (“Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a 
civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of 
making that contract is necessary.”). 
 76 Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 415.  See also Purdy v. California, 456 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1969) 
(“The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition 
that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive 
like treatment.”). 
 77 Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416.  See also Hargrove, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that the 
Hinman court “declined to acknowledge that lesbian and gay couples can have relation-
ships similar to those of married couples”). 
 78 See, e.g., Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that the benefits policy applies equally to heterosexual and homosexual employees, thus 
finding that it does not discriminate against the plaintiffs on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion); Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 520 (Colo. App. 1994) 
(finding that since “[a]n unmarried heterosexual employee also would not be permitted 
to take family sick leave benefits to care for his or her unmarried opposite-sex part-
ner . . . the rule does not treat homosexual employees and similarly situated heterosexual 
employees differently”). 
 79 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
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leges and immunities clause.80
Decided in the aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas,
  Tanner was the first major case to rec-
ognize that benefits provided to spouses of married state employees 
actually treat homosexual employees differently from heterosexual 
employees, and to hold the policy unconstitutional. 
81 the Montana Su-
preme Court in Snetsinger v. Montana University Systems found that the 
state university system was violating the equal protection rights of its 
same-sex employees by denying benefits to their partners.82  Unlike 
the policy at issue in Tanner, the benefits policy in Snetsinger provided 
the benefits to unmarried opposite-sex couples, as well.83  As a result, 
the true classification made by the program was one between unmar-
ried opposite-sex couples and unmarried same-sex couples, which al-
lowed the court to avoid determining whether the policy violated 
equal protection by classifying the couples based on sex.84  Neverthe-
less, classifications between unmarried opposite-sex couples and un-
married same-sex couples should be viewed as having the same effect 
as classifications between opposite-sex and same-sex couples more 
broadly, because they both draw irrational distinctions on the basis of 
sexual orientation.85  As a result of these distinctions, courts, includ-
ing the court in Snetsinger, find that there is no legitimate reason for 
the government to treat the two groups differently.86
Carter was a case that addressed the constitutionality of the denial 
of benefits to the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian state em-
 
 
 80 See Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
since homosexuals are not able to marry, the benefit program discriminates on the basis 
of sexual orientation and violates Oregon’s constitution).  See also supra text accompany-
ing note 15. 
 81 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodomy law that crimi-
nalized private acts of sodomy between consenting, same-sex adults as a violation of the 
Due Process Clause). 
 82 See Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004) (holding that “the Uni-
versity System’s policy violates equal protection of the laws under the Montana Constitu-
tion by impermissibly treating unmarried same-sex couples differently than unmarried 
opposite-sex couples”). 
 83 See id. at 451 (“Under the policy, the partner of a non-gay employee would qualify for 
benefits by signing an Affidavit, when the partner of a gay employee would not qualify for 
the same benefits when signing the same Affidavit.”). 
 84 In cases where benefits programs classify between unmarried opposite-sex and unmarried 
same-sex couples, the state cannot maintain that such programs are rationalized by their 
ability to promote marriage.  See id. (“A policy that allows unmarried opposite-sex couples 
to sign an Affidavit asserting they are common law married, when they may not be able to 
legally establish a common law marriage, certainly does not promote marriage, and in-
stead, detracts from it.”). 
 85 Id. at 452 (“These two groups, although similarly situated in all respects other than sexual 
orientation, are not treated equally and fairly.”). 
 86 Id. 
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ployees by state benefits programs.  Both Snetsinger and Carter were of 
particular importance, since Montana and Alaska are states with con-
stitutional marriage amendments defining marriage as between one 
man and one woman.87  The plaintiffs in Carter, the Alaska Civil Liber-
ties Union and nine same-sex couples, alleged “that because they are 
prohibited from marrying each other by Alaska Constitution article I, 
section 25, they are ineligible for the employment benefits the de-
fendants provide to married couples, resulting in a denial of the indi-
vidual plaintiffs’ right to equal protection.”88  The plaintiffs did not 
challenge the marriage amendment, however, but they instead chal-
lenged the public employers’ benefits program that denied them the 
benefits.89  The court found that although the marriage amendment 
precluded same-sex couples from marrying, the amendment itself 
clearly did not address employment benefits, since doing so could po-
tentially run afoul of the federal Constitution.90
After identifying the grounds for the alleged equal protection 
clause
 
91 violation, but before the court could implement Alaska’s 
more stringent equal protection standard,92 the court had to resolve 
two preliminary issues, one of which was to determine the classifica-
tion established by the benefits program.  While the plaintiffs as-
serted that the government treated same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples differently, the defendants argued that their programs diffe-
rentiated on the basis of marital status, or between married and un-
married couples.93  The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ interpreta-
tion by finding the proper comparison to be between same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples, since opposite-sex couples had the opportunity 
to marry and obtain the benefits, whereas same-sex couples did not.94
 
 87 See supra text accompanying nn.1 & 17. 
  
 88 Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 784 (Alaska 2005). 
 89 Id. at 784–85 (viewing plaintiff’s complaint as one challenging spousal limitations in the 
benefits programs). 
 90 Id. at 786, n.20 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)) (expressing the concern that 
an explicit denial of benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of public employees 
would offend the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting gays and lesbians from seeking a 
measure designed to protect them under the law). 
 91 Alaska’s equal protection clause also guarantees equal rights and opportunities to its citi-
zens.  See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 
(Alaska 2003) (“We have long recognized that the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection 
clause affords greater protection to individual rights than the United States Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 92 See Carter, 122 P.3d at 787 (citing Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420–21). 
 93 Carter, 122 P.3d at 788. 
 94 Id. 
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The second preliminary issue deals with the presence of discrimina-
tory intent, a concern that will be dealt with briefly in Part IV.C. 
Following the decision in Carter, other state courts continued to 
split95 over the classification made by benefit plans that provide bene-
fits for spouses and dependents of state employees, as well as the ap-
propriate analytical framework for resolving both statutory and con-
stitutional claims.  Nevertheless, in cases that have recently addressed 
the issue, courts in states with marriage statutes and amendments 
seem to be more likely to find in favor of awarding benefits to the 
domestic partners of gay and lesbian state employees.96
In Bedford v. New Hampshire Community Technical College System, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the state’s employment policy unlawfully dis-
criminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation.
 
97  The 
court looked at whether the plaintiffs were part of a protected class 
who qualified for the benefits, yet were denied despite their qualifica-
tion, while the benefits were provided to similarly situated persons 
outside their protected class.98  Here, the court found that the lesbian 
plaintiffs were a protected class, qualified for the benefits as part of 
their positions, and were denied the benefits while married, hetero-
sexual employees received the benefits.99  As such, the court agreed 
with the plaintiffs’ argument that conditioning benefits on marital 
status discriminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation.100  
By employing the classification framework of Carter,101 the court in 
Bedford was able to extend employee benefits to same-sex couples de-
spite New Hampshire’s marriage laws forbidding marriages between 
two men or two women.102
 
 95 Compare Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL 
1217283, at *6–7 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006) (finding that unmarried, heterosexual em-
ployees are not similarly situated to unmarried, gay, and lesbian employees for purposes 
of receiving employee benefits) with Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60, 
64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting Carter and Bedford and finding that a family member-
ship policy facially discriminates on the basis of marital status, not sexual orientation). 
  The significant parallels between the legal 
analyses of the classification requirement in these cases can and 
 96 See Lobsinger, supra note 17, at 135 (arguing that in Carter the Alaska Supreme Court was 
required to treat same-sex couples as their own class and to find that limiting state em-
ployee benefits to opposite-sex spouses violated Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause because 
of that state’s marriage amendment). 
 97 Bedford, 2006 WL 1217283, at *3.  
 98 Id. at *5. 
 99 Id. at *5, *11. 
100 Id. at *11. 
101 Id. at *10–11. 
102 Id. at *10.  See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457:2 (2007) (prohibiting same-sex 
marriage for men and women). 
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should provide support for similar arguments to be made in the con-
text of claims based upon the federal Equal Protection Clause. 
B.  Rational Basis or Heightened Scrutiny? 
The next interpretative difficulty that state courts have faced when 
considering claims to extend same-sex public employee benefits is 
over what level of judicial scrutiny should apply to these claims.  The 
difficulty is one that has arisen often in state and federal jurispru-
dence, and has been discussed frequently amongst commentators.103  
Scholars have also recognized that state constitutional amendments 
limiting civil marriage to one man and one woman are pushing the 
debate over which level of scrutiny applies to gays and lesbians into 
federal courts.104
As discussed earlier, courts often applied some form of rational 
basis review to cases where the classification at stake does not involve 
race, ethnicity, alienage, gender, or illegitimacy.
  This in turn suggests that more cases like Diaz v. 
Brewer and Martin v. El Paso are inevitable, so litigants should heed 
the lessons of state equal protection cases before bringing federal 
equal protection claims regarding gays and lesbians into federal 
court. 
105
In Hinman, the court found that the dental care plan challenged 
by the plaintiffs classified state employees on the basis of whether the 
employee was married or unmarried.
  This section looks 
at what scrutiny state courts have previously applied in cases to ex-
tend same-sex public employee benefits, and lays the groundwork for 
the discussion in Part V below over the level of scrutiny that the Diaz 
v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso courts suggest should apply in cases to 
prevent the benefits’ rescission. 
106  Since the classification was 
based on marital status, and was thus subject to rational basis review, 
the court held that the promotion of marriage constituted a legiti-
mate interest, to which the benefits were reasonably related.107
 
103 See, e.g., Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class:  Assessing the Political Power of 
LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 385, 386 (2010) (summarizing case law and scholarly literature and arguing that 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders should receive suspect class status). 
  Due 
to the lack of a discriminatory classification and the existence of a le-
gitimate state interest, the benefits survived the court’s rational basis 
104 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection 
Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2010). 
105 See supra Part IV.A 
106 Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
107 Id. at 417. 
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scrutiny and the plaintiffs’ state equal protection clause claim was re-
jected.108
The Montana Supreme Court in Snetsinger identified the classifica-
tion within state benefit programs as one that distinguished between 
unmarried same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples on 
the basis of sexual orientation.
 
109  Under Montana equal protection 
jurisprudence, the three levels of scrutiny and their respective tests 
are the same as the ones in federal jurisprudence, but the rights they 
apply to are slightly different:  (1) suspect classes and fundamental 
rights receive strict scrutiny; (2) middle-tier scrutiny applies to rights 
in Montana’s constitution that do not exist in its Bill of Rights; and 
(3) rational basis scrutiny is appropriate when the other levels do not 
apply.110  Even though at no point in the opinion does the court name 
the test that it is applying, it seems clear that the court is applying ra-
tional basis review, especially in the absence of a finding of a suspect 
class or fundamental right, and since the court concludes that there 
is “no legitimate governmental interest in treating the two groups dif-
ferently.”111
In Carter, the court applied Alaska’s three-step sliding-scale test, 
which is a judicial invention that recognizes the greater protection af-
forded by Alaska’s equal protection clause, in comparison to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
 
112
To determine what level of scrutiny applies, Alaska courts usually 
begin with the first step of the analysis, which requires the court “to 
determine what weight to give the individual interests affected by the 
benefits programs.”
  For this rea-
son, at least at first glance, it may appear that the portion of Carter 
where the court applies this test is not entirely relevant to federal 
equal protection jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, a closer examination 
of the court’s analysis of the level of scrutiny that it applies to the 
benefits program reveals that it is almost completely analogous to the 
level of scrutiny analysis under Snetsinger and under the federal Equal 
Protection Clause. 
113
 
108 Id. at 419. 
  Even though the plaintiffs contended that the 
benefits program significantly burdened important personal interests, 
the court found that this case did not require it to find whether the 
government action burdened any of the plaintiffs’ important interests 
109 Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004). 
110 Id. at 449–50. 
111 Id. at 452. 
112 Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005). 
113 Id. at 790. 
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or whether a fundamental right was implicated.114  Instead, the court 
found that since minimum scrutiny was sufficient to decide the case, 
it did not need to go any further in its first step analysis.115  The court 
viewed the employment benefits as an issue affecting only purely 
economic interests, thus mandating minimum scrutiny, or rational 
basis review, under Alaska law.116  Under minimum scrutiny, the 
second step required of Alaska’s test only required that the govern-
ment interests behind the law be “legitimate,” and the third step re-
quired a “fair and substantial relation”117 between the classification 
and the purpose of the law.118
Most significantly, the Carter court’s application of minimum scru-
tiny to the interests advocated by the government is nearly identical 
to those presented in Diaz I.
 
119  The state presented the court in Carter 
with three legitimate interests, which, as we will see in Part V below, 
were exactly the same as those that Arizona would later provide to the 
district court in Diaz I:  (1) cost control; (2) administrative efficiency; 
and (3) the promotion of marriage.120  The Carter court went on to re-
ject each of those rationales, because:  (1) the limitation of benefits 
to heterosexual couples did not advance the state’s goal of providing 
them to the individuals who were “closely connected” to the em-
ployee;121 (2) “the absolute exclusion of same-sex couples is not sub-
stantially related to the goal of maximizing administrative efficien-
cy”;122 and (3) “denying benefits to the same-sex domestic partners 
who are absolutely ineligible to become spouses has no demonstrated 
relationship to the interest of promoting marriage.”123
The limited case law regarding same-sex public employee benefits 
under state equal protection clauses makes it difficult to argue with 
 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 As the court in Carter put it, “Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause requires more than just a 
rational connection between a classification and a governmental interest; even at the low-
est level of scrutiny, the connection must be substantial.”  Id. at 791 (emphasis in original).  
See infra note 150. 
118 Id. at 790. 
119 Despite the fact that Alaska’s equal protection clause affords greater protection and thus 
may have lead the court to apply a heightened level of scrutiny, the court in Collins simi-
larly recognized that classifications harming politically unpopular groups or personal re-
lationships receive “a more searching form of rational basis review.”  See Collins v. Brewer 
(Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. 2010) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
120 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. at 804–07; Carter, 122 P.3d at 790. 
121 Carter, 122 P.3d at 791. 
122 Id. at 792. 
123 Id. at 793. 
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complete certainty that federal courts would uniformly apply a more 
searching form of rational basis review on par with the decision in 
Carter.  Nevertheless, as the discussion in Part V below will demon-
strate, the court in Diaz I readily adopted a level of scrutiny that in re-
ality is more demanding than traditional rational basis review.124
C.  The Intent to Discriminate 
  This 
suggests that other federal courts would do the same. 
The presence of an intent to discriminate can be an element of 
both state and federal equal protection claims,125 and it can be signifi-
cant in the realm of same-sex state employee benefits.  As mentioned 
in Part II above, plaintiffs are only required to prove an intent to dis-
criminate by the government when the effect of a law creates a classi-
fication, as opposed to a law that contains a facial classification.126
In Carter, the presence (or absence) of a discriminatory intent in 
the state’s benefits programs was the second preliminary issue to be 
addressed before the court could apply Alaska’s three-step sliding-
scale test.
 
127  The plaintiffs argued that Alaska’s equal protection 
clause did not require a showing of discriminatory intent, while the 
defendants argued that it did.128  Even though it was contested by the 
parties, the court found the resolution of that question to be unne-
cessary, since it determined that the benefit programs were facially 
discriminatory.129  By doing so, the court did not need to find intent, 
since the question of discriminatory intent is satisfied by a showing 
that the law is discriminatory on its face.130  The Carter court viewed 
the benefits programs as classifying gays and lesbians as a different 
group by the program’s own terms.131
 
124 See infra Part V. 
  Citing to a federal decision, the 
125 See, e.g., supra notes 45–46; infra notes 127–28. 
126 See supra Part II. 
127 Carter, 122 P.3d at 788. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill. 
1997). 
131 Carter, 122 P.3d at 788 (“When a ‘law by its own terms classifies persons for different 
treatment’, this is known as a facial classification.” (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4, at 711 (7th ed. 2004)).  Even though it may be 
suggested that the program’s “own terms” require an explicit reference to gays and les-
bians, the group being classified, the Carter court did not find that such a reference was 
necessary and instead viewed the program’s literal effect of denying benefits to gays and 
lesbians as a sufficient expression of its “own terms.”  A more recent edition of Rotunda 
and Nowak’s Constitutional Law treatise has cited to Carter’s interpretation as an example 
of a facial classification.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.4 n.5. 
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court stated that in these instances “there is no problem of proof and 
the court can proceed to test the validity of the classification by the 
appropriate standard.”132
Federal courts and at least some state courts do not require proof 
of discriminatory intent for laws with facial classifications when they 
are challenged under the doctrine of equal protection.
  As a result, the lack of proof of discrimina-
tory intent did not prevent the plaintiffs from raising an equal protec-
tion claim under Alaska’s constitution, and the court proceeded to its 
three-step sliding-scale test as discussed in Part IV.B above. 
133
V.  FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CLAIMS IN CURRENT 
LITIGATION TO RETAIN SAME-SEX PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
  So long as 
courts like the one in Carter find that benefit programs facially classify 
gays and lesbians as a different group, then discriminatory intent will 
not be a hurdle to plaintiffs bringing state or federal equal protection 
clause claims—but as will be discussed below, in Diaz v. Brewer, courts 
may still struggle with this issue in the absence of authoritative guid-
ance. 
As discussed in Part IV above, arguments involving state equal 
protection clauses played a formative role in legal efforts to expand 
state employee benefits to same-sex couples.  Yet now that domestic 
partnership benefits have been provided in several communities,134 a 
number of economic or political reasons could encourage state legis-
lators and officials to seek their repeal.  This Comment has identified 
at least four different communities where local leaders, state legisla-
tors, or the public have sought the removal of same-sex135 domestic 
partnership benefits.136
 
132 Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at 1133. 
  While not all repeal efforts have led to litiga-
tion, and not all litigation has been successful, an inquiry into the le-
gal responses to the threat of repeal is a worthy endeavor.  This 
Comment proposes that state equal protection clause cases like Tan-
133 See supra notes 61–64. 
134 See supra note 9. 
135 These actions at minimum seek to remove same-sex domestic partnership benefits, but 
some (like Diaz I) remove the benefits for both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic part-
ners.  Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 801 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
136 See supra note 9.  The state of Michigan could be considered an additional community, 
but in that case the plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that Michigan’s newly approved 
marriage amendment did not strip same-sex benefits provided by public employers—an 
outcome which the court had previously refused to oblige.  See National Pride at Work v. 
Michigan, 732 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Mich. App. 2007) (ruling that the marriage amendment 
precluded public employers from extending benefits to domestic partners of the same 
sex).  See also supra note 280. 
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ner, Snetsinger, and Carter should serve as a model for future cases like 
Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso that rely on the federal Equal Pro-
tection Clause, since they offer the best approach for maintaining 
state employment benefits for same-sex couples. 
A.  Diaz v. Brewer:  Protecting Same-Sex Public Employee Benefits Under the 
Federal Equal Protection Clause 
The state of Arizona, like many others, provides subsidized health 
care benefits to state employees and their dependents.137  Prior to the 
adoption of Section O, Arizona state regulations defined eligible de-
pendents to include each employee’s spouse or domestic partner of 
the same or opposite sex,138 which allowed state employees in same-
sex relationships to obtain the same benefits as married heterosexual 
couples.139  Nevertheless, the adoption of Section O changed the de-
finition of dependents to exclude domestic partners of both sexes 
and only provide coverage for an employee’s spouse.140
The plaintiffs, gay and lesbian state employees with same-sex do-
mestic partners, brought an action against the state and its governor, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
 
141
Plaintiffs will suffer . . . harms based on their sexual orientation and their 
sex in relation to the sex of their committed life partner because the 
State has enacted legislation that intentionally eliminates family health 
insurance for lesbian and gay State employees and not heterosexual em-
ployees.  As a result of the adoption and enforcement of Section O, hete-
rosexual State employees continue to have a way of obtaining family 
health insurance but the only way lesbian and gay State employees have 
had to obtain that insurance has been eliminated.
  The complaint alleged in 
part that: 
142
The complaint also alleged that the State violated the plaintiffs’ right 
to equal protection, and specifically their right not to be denied 
equal protection on the basis of their sexual orientation.
 
143
 
137 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 799. 
  To pre-
vent Section O from taking effect, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a 
138 Dependents also include the employee’s children and the children of their domestic 
partner.  See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-5-416(C) (2008). 
139 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 800. 
140 Id. at 801.  See also supra note 138. 
141 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801. 
142 Amended Complaint at 3–4, Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d. 797 (No. CV9-2402-PHX-
JWS). 
143 Id. at 34. 
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preliminary injunction that asked the court to enjoin the state from 
enforcing Section O.144
In the court’s decision granting the preliminary injunction and 
denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, it stated that the plaintiffs 
were “highly skilled State employees whose job duties [were] equiva-
lent to the duties of their heterosexual colleagues.”
 
145  The court rec-
ognized that the plaintiffs and their partners “enjoyed [] long-term, 
committed, and financially interdependent relationship[s] and would 
marry if Arizona law permitted same-sex couples to marry.”146  Lastly, 
it noted that if Section O went into effect, each of the plaintiff’s do-
mestic partners and their qualifying children who were enrolled in 
the state healthcare plan would lose their benefits.147
The district court first looked to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 
148  
Similar to the analysis in Tanner and Carter, the Diaz I court attempted 
to identify the classification of groups within Section O.149  The Four-
teenth Amendment requires that “the classification must be reasona-
ble, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so 
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”150  
While the plaintiffs argued that Section O deliberately classified state 
employees into heterosexual couples and homosexual couples, Ari-
zona contended that Section O was a neutral policy that treated all 
unmarried employees equally.151
Even though the court found that Section O was not discriminato-
ry on its face, it stated that “as applied Section O ‘unquestionably im-
poses differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation,’ and 
makes benefits available on terms that are a legal impossibility for gay 
 
 
144 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 799. 
145 Id. at 802.  For purposes of motion to dismiss, all of the plaintiff’s allegations of material 
fact are accepted as true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.  Id. (citing Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
146 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. at 799. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 803 (identifying a distinction between unmarried heterosexual state employees and 
unmarried homosexual employees); Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 
122 P.3d 781, 787–88 (Alaska 2005) (identifying the distinction as between same-sex 
couples and opposite-sex couples, whether married or not); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. 
Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 447 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (identifying unmarried homosexual couples 
as a class). 
150 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).  Note that the “fair and sub-
stantial” language describes the exact same relationship that the Alaska Supreme Court 
required in Carter.  See Carter, 122 P.3d at 791. 
151 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 803. 
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and lesbian couples.”152  The finding that Section O was not facially 
discriminatory typically means that the court will require proof of in-
tent to discriminate.153  Nevertheless, the Diaz I court’s citation of 
Judge Reinhardt’s opinion in In re Levenson154 suggests that it viewed 
the statute as facially discriminatory under a disparate treatment 
framework.155  As Judge Reinhardt recognized, “the differential 
treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex couples ‘cannot be unders-
tood as having merely a disparate impact on gay persons, but instead 
properly must be viewed as directly classifying and prescribing dis-
tinct treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.’”156  Despite the 
lack of legal clarity in Diaz I on this issue, the court’s ultimate finding 
that Section O burdens the plaintiffs on the basis of their sexual 
orientation subjected it to scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.157
Continuing its Equal Protection Clause analysis, the Diaz I court 
next looked to what level of scrutiny should apply to its evaluation of 
Section O’s constitutionality.
 
158  The plaintiffs argued that some form 
of heightened scrutiny should apply, because Section O treated the 
plaintiffs differently on the basis of their sexual orientation, because 
gays and lesbians have a history of discrimination and political disad-
vantage, and because sexual orientation is an immutable characteris-
tic.159
 
152 Id. 
  The court recognized that some form of heightened scrutiny 
153 See Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. 
Ill. 1997). 
154 In re Levenson was a case filed in the Ninth Circuit by a federal public defender, who had 
legally married his same-sex partner under California law but was denied healthcare ben-
efits for his partner as part of his federal employment.  Judge Reinhardt heard the case, 
as designee of the Chair of the Ninth Circuit’s Standing Committee on Federal Public 
Defenders, and held that the plaintiff’s rights under the employee benefit plan were vi-
olated on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the application of DOMA to the plan 
violated the plaintiff’s right to due process under the U.S. Constitution.  In re Levenson, 
560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009). 
155 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (quoting In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1147). 
156 In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1147 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008)). 
157 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 803.  The uncertainty over whether the Diaz I court 
viewed the statute as facially discriminatory or facially neutral, and thus applied disparate 
treatment or disparate impact analysis, is significant to the case, since the requirement of 
whether plaintiffs must introduce proof of intentional discrimination hinges on that de-
termination.  It is especially relevant given that the plaintiffs are bringing a constitutional 
claim, as opposed to potential statutory claims based on an anti-discrimination statute 
protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination in the workplace.  Here, Arizona does 
not have a statewide law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
the workplace.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463. 
158 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 804. 
159 Id. 
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might apply, but in a manner similar to Snetsinger,160 Carter,161 and In re 
Levenson,162 it punted on the question by finding that the plaintiffs 
stated “an equal protection claim that is plausible on its face even 
under the rational basis standard of review.”163
The court’s suggestion that heightened scrutiny should apply was 
particularly noteworthy given its citation of Justice O’Connor’s con-
currence in Lawrence v. Texas.
 
164  In Lawrence, the Court overruled its 
prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,165 by holding a Texas sodomy sta-
tute unconstitutional on the basis of privacy and liberty interests un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment.166  Although in Bowers the Court 
found gays and lesbians not to be a suspect class warranting heigh-
tened scrutiny, Lawrence was the first indication that the Court may 
apply heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing on the basis of 
sexual orientation.167  Traditionally, federal courts have classified 
groups as being suspect because:  (1) they have historically been 
stigmatized or discriminated against; (2) they share an immutable 
character trait; and (3) the trait does not affect their ability to contri-
bute to society.168  As other commentators have argued, a great deal of 
evidence exists to support the idea that gays and lesbians should be 
considered a suspect class for constitutional analysis.169
 
160 See Snetsinger v. Montana Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004) (“[W]e need not 
address the Appellants’ arguments that the policy violates equal protection by classifying 
them based on sex or that it violates their rights.”). 
  To briefly 
summarize current scholarship on the subject, gays and lesbians 
should be deemed a suspect class because:  (1) they have been a his-
torical target of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion; (2) legal jurisprudence “supports the notion that sexual orienta-
tion bears no relation to individuals’ ability to participate and 
161 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 790 (Alaska 2005) 
(“But because minimum scrutiny is sufficient to resolve this case, we do not need to de-
cide whether the plaintiffs’ interests are ‘important’ or whether a ‘fundamental right’ is 
affected.”). 
162 In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1149 (finding that “the denial of benefits here cannot survive 
even rational basis review, the least searching form of constitutional scrutiny,” thus “it is 
not necessary to determine whether or which form of heightened scrutiny is applicable to 
this claim”). 
163 Collins, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 804. 
164 Id. at 804 n.38 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)(O’Connor, J., concur-
ring)). 
165 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (holding that due process is not violated by a state statute that criminalizes sodo-
my, since homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right). 
166 Powers, supra note 103, at 387.   
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 388 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973)). 
169 Powers, supra note 103, at 387. 
Apr. 2012] SAME-SEX EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 1379 
 
contribute to society”; and (3) cases have mostly accepted the notion 
that sexual orientation is immutable.170
Arizona gave five rationales for Section O:  (1) the statute “will 
save the State millions of dollars per year”;
  Neither the Supreme Court, 
nor any of the cases discussed in this Comment, have undergone this 
analysis, but Diaz v. Brewer and other cases following Lawrence suggest 
a movement towards the identification of gays and lesbians as a sus-
pect class at most, and at minimum, recognition of the more search-
ing scrutiny applied to gays and lesbians even under rational basis re-
view. 
171 (2) the statute will be 
“much easier to administer”;172 (3) “scarce funds for employee bene-
fits are better spent on employees and dependents as defined in the 
new statute”;173 (4) “this benefit would be most valuable to married 
persons, who are more likely to have dependent children”;174 and (5) 
the new statute “would further the rational, long-standing and well-
recognized government interest in favoring marriage.”175
As for the cost savings rationale, the court looked to Graham v. 
Richardson for the proposition that states may not “attempt to limit 
[their] expenditures . . . by invidious distinctions between classes of 
[their] citizens.”
  As men-
tioned in Part IV.B, four of these rationales—numbered (2) through 
(5)—are nearly identical to the rationales that the court in Carter re-
viewed and rejected.  Similarly, the Diaz I court addressed and dis-
missed each of the rationales in turn. 
176  The court found the principle to be applicable 
because “Section O rests on an invidious distinction between hetero-
sexual and homosexual State employees who are similarly situated.”177  
Moreover, as this was an order denying defendant’s motion for dis-
missal, the court accepted as true facts alleged in the plaintiff’s com-
plaint that the minor additional costs of providing benefits to same-
sex couples was offset by not having to provide the benefits through 
Arizona’s Medicaid program.178
 
170 Id. at 388–89. 
  Regarding the state’s goal of admin-
istrative efficiency, the court noted that “the Constitution recognizes 
higher values than speed and efficiency”—with the prevention of in-
171 Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 804–05. 
174 Id. at 805. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
177 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
178 Id. 
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vidious classifications being one of them.179  The court considered the 
third rationale—that funds are better spent on heterosexual em-
ployees—as discriminatory on its face,180 suggesting that it raised at 
least the implication of Romer v. Evans.181  Lastly, the court found that 
Section O’s distinction between heterosexual and homosexual em-
ployees was not “legitimately, rationally, [or] substantially” related to 
Arizona’s fourth and fifth rationales, which seek to favor or promote 
marriage but in reality make the same invidious classification.182  
Since the court was unable to identify any other legitimate state in-
terest that would support Section O, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs were able to meet the four 
elements for a motion for preliminary injunction, which the court 
granted.183
Soon thereafter, the defendants in Diaz I appealed the prelimi-
nary injunction to the Ninth Circuit.
 
184  The defendants’ principal ar-
gument was that the district court had incorrectly accepted as true all 
of the plaintiffs’ allegations in their motion for a preliminary judg-
ment.185  However, the district court’s opinion dealt with two mo-
tions—the defendants’ motion to dismiss, for which the proper stan-
dard of review is to accept all of the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, and 
the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, for which the stan-
dard is whether the plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on 
the merits.186  The Ninth Circuit found that the district court properly 
applied each standard to the respective motion.187
In reviewing the district court’s order, the Ninth Circuit noted the 
court’s emphasis on the lack of evidence put forth by the State re-
 
 
179 Id. at 806 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
180 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 806. 
181 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding that “laws of the kind now before us 
raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward 
the class of persons affected”). 
182 Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
183 Id.  The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument under the Due Process Clause.  Id. 
at 809.  Since this Comment advocates for an approach based on Equal Protection Clause 
claims, discussion of the due process claim is outside its scope, despite the fact that the 
Supreme Court in practice ignores the formal distinction between equal protection and 
due process.  See Yoshino, supra note 49, at 749 (“Too much emphasis has been placed on 
the formal distinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection 
guarantees and the liberty claims made under the due process or other guarantees.  In 
practice, the Court does not abide by this distinction.”). 
184 Diaz v. Brewer (Diaz II), 656 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
185 Id. at 1012–13. 
186 Id. at 1013. 
187 Id. 
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garding cost savings, which was the State’s primary justification for 
the statute.188  Moreover, the State did not seriously challenge the dis-
trict court’s finding regarding cost savings on appeal.189  The appeals 
court then looked to United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno190 
for the proposition that “when a state chooses to provide such bene-
fits, it may not do so in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that 
adversely affects particular groups that may be unpopular.”191  View-
ing the present circumstances as even “more compelling” than those 
in Moreno, the Ninth Circuit found that the Arizona benefit pro-
gram’s eligibility was restricted in a manner that prevents same-sex 
couples from retaining eligibility by operation of law.192  The district 
court’s decision was, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, “consistent 
with long standing equal protection jurisprudence holding that 
‘some objectives, such as a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpo-
pular group, are not legitimate state interests.’”193
B.  Martin v. El Paso 
 
The case of Martin v. El Paso,194 while presenting an array of legal 
issues, ultimately shaped into a drawn-out legal battle similar to Diaz 
v. Brewer.  Religious groups195 and conservative Christians196 in El Paso, 
Texas sought to have a public referendum that would prevent the city 
from extending domestic partnership benefits to its employees.197
 
188 Id. 
  
The professed goal of the groups was to remove the benefits for same-
sex partners of city employees, since some of them believed that the 
program “sends young people the message that the city thinks it is 
189 Id. 
190 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  In Moreno, the Supreme Court held that an amendment defining 
the term “household” to limit a food stamp program’s eligible recipients to related family 
members was invalid, concluding that the classification was without basis and aimed at an 
unpopular group.  Id. at 529–38. 
191 Diaz v. Brewer (Diaz II), 656 F.3d at 1013. 
192 Id. at 1014. 
193 Id. at 1014–15 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (internal quotations omitted). 
194 Notice of Removal, Martin v. El Paso, No. 3:10-cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2010). 
195 See Marty Schladen, Domestic Partners Vote Nears:  Group Offers Free Weddings as Initiative 
Draws Criticism, EL PASO TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/
news/ci_16300999 (citing El Paso for Jesus as “one of the organizations that oppose tax-
payer-funded medical insurance for unmarried partners of city government employees”). 
196 See Campoy, supra note 11 (providing an example of conservative Christians attempting to 
deny benefits to same-sex couples). 
197 See Schladen, supra note 195. 
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permissible to fornicate and be gay.”198  The ballot initiative stated:  
“The city of El Paso endorses traditional family values by making 
health benefits available only to city employees and their legal spouse 
and dependent children.”199  Incidentally, when the ballot initiative 
passed with 55% of the vote, the language of the ballot also had the 
effect of eliminating benefits for city officials, who are not technically 
employees of the city, as well as many retirees who were no longer city 
employees but had been offered benefits upon their retirement.200
As a result, the president of the El Paso Municipal Police Officer’s 
Association, in addition to a lesbian police officer, her domestic part-
ner, and other plaintiffs, brought suit against the city, alleging claims 
under the federal Equal Protection Clause, the equal protection and 
contract clauses of the Texas Constitution, as well as other state law 
claims.
 
201  The plaintiffs alleged that the government interest in pass-
ing the ordinance, “endorsing traditional family values,” is not a sig-
nificant and legitimate public interest.202  Moreover, they argued that 
the ordinance is unconstitutional since its discrimination “bears no 
rational relationship to the interest of endorsing traditional family 
values.”203
After being transferred to federal court,
 
204 Judge Frank Montalvo 
of the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Texas ruled that 
the plaintiffs had not established a violation under the federal Equal 
Protection Clause.205  The court found that, due to the “unexpected 
consequences” of direct democracy, the ordinance’s language limits 
health coverage to city employees, their legal spouses and dependent 
children, thereby distinguishing between those people and “everyone 
else.”206  Therefore, since the ordinance did not “affect a discrete 
group” nor “identify a class which it treats disparately,” a threshold of 
equal protection analysis was not met.207
 
198 Id. 
 
199 Id. 
200 Campoy, supra note 11. 
201 See Complaint at 4, Martin v. El Paso, No. 2010-4936 (El Paso County Ct., 34th Jud. Dist. 
Dec. 15, 2010). 
202 Id. at 5. 
203 Id. 
204 Notice of Removal, Martin v. El Paso, No. 3:10-cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. filed Dec. 21, 
2010). 
205 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Complaint For Declaratory Judg-
ment and to Annul or Invalidate Municipal Ordinance at 18, Martin v. El Paso, No. 3:10-
cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2011). 
206 Id. at 17–18. 
207 Id. at 18. 
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Despite the absence of a violation, the court went on to advise the 
parties how it would have ruled had the ordinance targeted domestic 
partners specifically.208  Such an ordinance would create a discrete 
group, leading the court to employ rational basis scrutiny.  However, 
even under rational basis scrutiny, the court questioned whether the 
state’s proclaimed interest in “endorsing traditional family values” is a 
legitimate one, citing to both Lawrence and Moreno.209  Lastly, the court 
noted that even if it was a legitimate state interest, it was unclear “how 
removing health care benefits from domestic partners would rational-
ly relate to that interest,” and the court flatly rejected an interest 
based on budgetary concerns.210
Even though the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, the issue remained 
that the city needed to restore benefits to the elected officials and re-
tirees.
 
211  Faced with the options of restoring benefits to all and deal-
ing with the wrath of voters, or restoring benefits to all except domes-
tic partners and dealing with the wrath of the courts, the City Council 
voted 4-4, with the Mayor’s vote in favor as tie-breaker, in support of 
restoring benefits to all individuals affected by the ordinance.212  The 
controversy did not end there, however.  Shortly afterwards, the same 
religious groups who supported the ordinance formed a political ac-
tion committee, El Pasoans for Traditional Family Values, and have 
led recall campaigns against the city’s mayor and two of the city 
council members who voted in favor of restoring the benefits.213
Although Martin v. El Paso did not ultimately resolve the equal 
protection violation at issue in Diaz v. Brewer, the consequences of the 
decision are still enfolding and will likely have important ramifica-
tions for communities elsewhere that seek to strip same-sex couples 
of public employee benefits. 
 
 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 18–19 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003), and Moreno v. U.S. 
Dept. of Agriculture, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)). 
210 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Complaint For Declaratory Judg-
ment and to Annul or Invalidate Municipal Ordinance at 19–20, Martin v. El Paso, No. 
3:10-cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2011). 
211 Adriana M. Chávez, Judge Upholds Ban on Domestic Partner Benefits, EL PASO TIMES, May 25, 
2011, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_18132235. 
212 Marty Schladen, City Restores Domestic Partner Benefits, EL PASO TIMES, June 14, 2011, availa-
ble at http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_18270403. 
213 Marty Schladen, Mayor Tells Court of Intent to Appeal Recall Ruling, EL PASO TIMES, Dec. 6, 
2011, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_19477399. 
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VI.  AN EXPANSIVE FUTURE FOR FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION 
Tanner, Snetsinger, Carter, and all of the other state cases dealing 
with the expansion of same-sex employee benefits provide important 
lessons for future plaintiffs who seek to bring similar claims in federal 
court.214
A.  Classifications on the Basis of Sexual Orientation 
  Although outcomes will always be dependent in part on the 
statutory and constitutional language at issue, judicial precedent, and 
the particular facts of each case, these cases demonstrate that com-
mon equal protection theoretical underpinnings exist across state 
and federal jurisdictions.  As more cases like Diaz v. Brewer and Martin 
v. El Paso begin to enter federal court, litigants should take note of 
the parallel legal analyses that exist under state and federal equal 
protection jurisprudences in order to maximize their chances at suc-
cess.  Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the experience of states 
in extending benefits to same-sex state employees should guide fed-
eral litigants and the courts in reaching similar outcomes, since cases 
premised on the Equal Protection Clause provide sound constitu-
tional authority for litigants to refute attempts by state legislators, of-
ficials, or even the general public to repeal same-sex benefits for pub-
lic employees. 
Despite early cases that identified benefit programs or policies as 
having classified between married and unmarried couples for the 
purposes of equal protection analysis, courts are more willing to look 
past the legal fiction of these policies in order to find a constitutional 
violation.  Cases like Tanner and Carter hold value outside their state 
jurisdictions, because of the pragmatic rationales expressed in their 
decisions.  As these cases have articulated, laws or policies that restrict 
benefits to legal spouses of public employees classify not on marital 
status but on the basis of sexual orientation, because by their terms 
gay and lesbian employees can never qualify for benefits in states that 
deny them the right to marry, whereas unmarried heterosexuals have 
the option of marrying.  The classification becomes even more crys-
tallized in the context of the rescission of domestic partner benefits.  
The removal of the benefits, while not having direct significance in 
constitutional analysis, clarifies for the court that the legislation itself 
is creating two classes—unmarried couples that have the option of 
 
214 All of the same lessons from the state cases certainly can and should be used at the state 
level to further expand same-sex employment benefits in other states that currently do 
not provide them. 
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marrying and receiving the benefits, and homosexual, unmarried 
couples that do not.  Even though earlier cases like Hinman and Ross 
did not recognize the distinction in the context of the expansion of 
benefits, Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso provide hope that judges 
can recognize such classifications within policies that seek their with-
drawal. 
B.  Movement Towards Heightened Scrutiny (or Dignity?) 
The decision over whether to apply rational basis or heightened 
scrutiny to the classifications created by these laws is still an issue of 
significant debate.  The order in Diaz I did much to advance the 
cause of heightened scrutiny, despite its stated decision to ultimately 
apply rational basis scrutiny to the government’s interests.  This is 
largely due to the court’s recognition of In re Levenson215 and Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence216 as having precedential value, 
which itself is a significant step towards the acknowledgement of gays 
and lesbians as a suspect or protected class.217  Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence, some state and federal courts used the 
criminalization of homosexual conduct as a rationale for denying 
suspect classification, and thus heightened scrutiny, to homosex-
uals.218
It is outside the scope of this Comment to advocate for one level 
of scrutiny over another, but these cases emphasize the apparent wil-
lingness of some courts, both state and federal, to scrutinize classifica-
tions on the basis of sexual orientation in benefit programs under ra-
tional basis review and find that there are no legitimate reasons for 
  Nonetheless, as Diaz v. Brewer, Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence in Lawrence, and In re Levenson suggest, courts are willing to 
scrutinize more closely the rationales provided by states who seek to 
remove same-sex employee benefits, even if they do not expressly 
admit it. 
 
215 See Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 n.34 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citing In re 
Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
216 See Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 804 n.38 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)). 
217 See Powers, supra note 103 (discussing why LGBT individuals are a suspect class and the 
necessity of applying heightened scrutiny in order to remedy this issue and ensure equal 
protection). 
218 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 
1990) (finding that gays are not a suspect class because homosexual conduct is not a fun-
damental right as decided in Bowers); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (reasoning that homosexuals do not constitute a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class if homosexual conduct can constitutionally be crimina-
lized). 
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these classifications.  This Comment also does not address the courts’ 
apparent movement away from equality claims and towards individual 
liberty claims, as identified by Professor Kenji Yoshino.219  Professor 
Yoshino describes how this movement has led to the rise of hybrid 
equality/liberty claims, which he terms “dignity” claims, and believes 
that “liberty-based” dignity claims will allow the Court to continue 
upholding equality in our increasingly pluralistic society.220  Neverthe-
less, this Comment argues that there is still a place for equal protec-
tion jurisprudence and particularly for classifications on the basis of 
sexual orientation, by subscribing to Professor Eskridge’s view that 
the Equal Protection Clause alone can provide gays and lesbians with 
constitutional “challenges to an array of interconnected discrimina-
tions in state benefits as well as burdens.”221
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  Provided that they are 
grounded in a strong factual basis, Equal Protection Clause claims 
that challenge a statute’s classification, the rationality of government 
interests, as well as the relationship between the two, are more likely 
than ever before to meet success. 
 In conclusion, this Comment has explored the relationship be-
tween state equal protection claims in state cases to expand same-sex 
public employee benefits, and federal Equal Protection Clause claims 
brought in federal court to prevent their repeal.  Despite their differ-
ences, these cases demonstrate an emerging trend in state and feder-
al courts towards the recognition of the classifications within benefits 
programs as discrimination against gay and lesbian employees on the 
basis of their sexual orientation.  Moreover, both state and federal 
courts have been willing to closely scrutinize the rationales proffered 
by government entities, despite doing so under the guise of rational 
basis review. 
Litigants in same-sex public benefits cases have a tremendous op-
portunity to bring the parallel experience of state equal protection 
jurisprudence to the federal courts, with the possibility of expanding 
federal equal protection doctrine to include the recognition of public 
servants who rely upon benefits to take care of their same-sex part-
 
219 See Yoshino, supra note 49, at 748 (“Most notably, the Court has moved away from group-
based equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
220 Id. at 749–50. 
221 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1183, 1216 (2000). 
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ners and dependent children.  The opportunity exists despite, or ar-
guably even because of, state constitutional provisions and statutes 
that define marriage as between one man and one woman.  As a criti-
cal step in the inevitable progression towards marriage rights for 
same-sex couples, let us hope this opportunity does not go to waste. 
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